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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD ROBINSON and WILLIAM C. WARD, dba CRYSTAL
PALA CE MARKET,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.

vs.

11308

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AS-)
SURANCE CORPORATION,
LIMITED, a corporation,
Def end.ant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by an insurance company, suing in
the name of its insureds, Crystal Palace Market, against
another insurance company, to recover amounts paid in
settlement of an action br ought against Crystal Palace
by a third party who claimed injuries resulting from a
defective and dangerous condition of the Crystal Palace
1

premises.

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After filing their complaint seeking indemnification
from respondent, appellants moved for summary judgment supported by a copy of a deposition of the third
party, Robert E. Kodat, taken in the prior action, copies
of the insurance policie.s involved, a diagram and photograph of appellants' premises, and the affidavit of Raymond M. Berry, attorney for appellants, identifying the
other documents. Thereafter, respondent filed its motion
for summary judgment which was supported by the same
documents, the affidavit of Shirley P. Jones, Jr., attorney for respondent and a copy of the complaint filed
against appe.p.ants in the prior action. Both motions were
beard on May 28, 1968, by the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson who on May 29, 1968, i,ssued a memorandum
decision denying appellants' motion for summary judgment and granting that of respondent. Summary judgment was entered on the same date.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent has no actual knowledge as to many of
the facts stated in appellants' brief, but does not generally disagree with appellants' statement. However, one
very important fact has been omitted. Inasmuch as
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respondent's obligations are controlled by the facts
pleaded in the prior action it is necessary to look at the
complaint in that action. From an examination of that
complaint (R-125) it will readily appear that respondent
had no obligation to defend the action brought by Mr.
Kodat. Mr. Kodat's action was based upon the grounds
that appellants' (defendants in that action) premises were
not safe, in that the stairway leading up to the delivery
dock was without sufficient handrails or protective devices, that the stairway was ,in need of repair 'Of which
the owners had knowledge and that the stairway was
littered with sweepings. In other words, Mr. Kodat's own
contention was that his injurie,s were caused as a result
of a dangerous and defective condition of the premises
of Crystal Palace Market. Nowhere in the complaint
is there any reference to a truck insured by respondent, nor to any loading or unloading.
At the time Mr. Kodat allegedly suffered his injury,
he had not started to take any merchandise· ·out ·Of the
truck (R-31) and the evidence is unclear as to exactly
what he was doing when he went up the steps to the dock
at the Crystal Palace Market.
Further, there is a provi,sion in respondent's policy
which, as an addit.iional ground, precludes recovery by
appellants and which was not cited by appellants in their
brief. That is, Exclusion ( e) which provides (R-18):
"This policy does not apply, under Coverage
A, to any obligation for which the ins~red or adny
carrier as his insurer may be held liable un er
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any workmen's compensation, unemployment
compensation or disability benefits law or under
any ,similar law.''
'

ARGUMENT

I
THERE WAS NOT AN ACTUAL USE OF THE
INSURED TRUCK BY APPELLANTS IN LOADING
OR UNLOADiI:NG OF THE TRUCK OR ANY
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOADING
OR UNLOADING AND THE INJURIES TO MR.
KODAT. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE UNDER RESPONDENT'S POLICY.
Respondent does not argue with appellants' contentions that the words "loading and unloading" are words
of expansion or that Utah has generally adopted the
"complete .operations" rule. The Utah case cited by
appellants, Pacific .Automobile Insura;nce Co. v. Corrtr
mercial Casualty and Insurance Co., 108 Utah 500, 161
P.2d 423 (1945) does not by any ,stretch of the imagination extend coverage under the loading and unloading
clause to the point that appellants would have it extended
here. In Pacific the injuries were caused by the driver of
the insured truck, directly in the ciourse of making a delivery from the truck. The injuries were to a third party,
not to an insured under the automobile policy. There was
no question of whether the person whose negligence
caused the injury was an omnibus insured under the
policy. The issue was which of two policies issued to

4
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the brewing company covered the injuries - the general
liability policy or the automobile policy. The court merely
held that the act of raising the trap door was directly
connected with the loading and unl oading of the truck
and that the automobile policy was applicable. As a matter of fact, the court clearly pointed out that "there must
be some causal relationship between the use of the insured 's vehicle as a vehicle and the accident for which
recovery is sought." (Emphasis added), and that the
intention of the parties tio the insurance contract must be
kept in mind in determining coverage. Considering these
two points in the present c&se it is obvious that there is
no coverage afforded by respondent's policy. Moreover,
none of the other cases cited by appellants are authority
for the proposition they urge. As pointed out below, all
are clearly distinguishable in one manner or another,
but principally because there was a direct causal relationship between the use of the automobile or truck in those
cases and the injury complained ·of. There wa•s no such
causal relationship in this case. Decisions which are more
clearly in point deny coverage in situations similar to
1

the present one.
A recent case is General Accident Fire & Life Insurance Corp. v. Brown, 181 N.E. 2d 191 (Ill. App.,
1962). There, Employers Mutual Casualty Company had
issued an automobile liability policy to Brown Bros.
Cartage Co. The policy contained a loading and unload.ing clause and an omnibus clause almost identical to
those contained in the policy issued by respondent here.
Under contract, Brown Bros. delivered merchandise for
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Libby Furniture Company, who was insured under a
general liability policy issued by General Accident.
While one of Brown Bros.' employee·s was carrying two
lamps from Libby's dock to Brown Bros.' truck he fell
from the loading <look and injured his leg. He filed suit
against Libby, claiming that "his injuries were the
direct result of Libby's defective, hazardous and negligently maintained dock."
Libby'.s, through General Accident, tendered the
suit to Employers on the ground that the injury was the
result of the loading and unloading operation of Brown
Bros.' vehicle. Employers denied coverage and a declaratory judgment action was brought by General Accident. The trial court found in favor of Employers and ,
the appellate court affirmed, saying:
"There must be, as contended by defendant,
a causal connection between the use of the truck
and the injury. Although a number of cases similar to ours did not contain a discussion of this
essential factor, the ones involving a close ques- ,
tion of causation, point out that the loading and
unloading clause, being merely an extension of
the 'use' of the vehicle which is covered by the
policy, dioes not invoke the coverage of the policy
unless there is the same degree of causal connection between the loading or unloading and the accident as would be required between the actual
drivinoor use of the vehicle itself and a resulting
0
accident. (citing cases). Thus, unless we can d~termine that the loading of the truck was the efficient and predominating cause of Blakesley's injury, the matter will not c?me within the term of
EmpLoyers automobile policy.
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"On the record before us we cannot say that
Blakesley',s injury was caused by the loading of
the truck. In his suit Blakesley alleged that his
injury was caused solely by Libby's defective
dock and their negligence in failing to. maintain it.
Libby owned and controlled the dock and clearly
had sole responsibility for its maintenance. There
were no allegations tio the effect that Blakesley's
carrying of merchandise in any way contributed
to his fall, nor that any merchandise or anything
connected with the loading operation or the truck
itself in any way caused his injury.'' (Emphasis
added).
The court, noting its satisfaction that the injury
was caused by an independent factor or intervening
cause wholly disassociated with and remote from the use
of the truck, said that even assuming that injury could
be said to have beein caused by the loading of the truck,
the protection of Employers' policy could not be invoked
because of a clause excluding liability:
"to any obligation for which the insured or any
company as his insurer may be held liable, under
any workman ',s compensation law ... "
Another pertinent case is Moore-McCormick Lines,
Inc. v. MarY'land Casualty Co·., 181 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.
N.Y., 1959). An employee of the plaintiff was injured
while unloading bags of naptholine onto a truck owned
by a construction company, which was insured by defendant Maryland Casualty under an automobile insurance policy containing loading and unloading and
omnibus clauses. The employee sued the plaintiff, alleging that his injuries were the result of its negligence
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in permitting the bags of naptholine to remain on the
deck of the 1ship while being transported, thereby being
subject to exposure to the elements and for allowing an
unsafe and dangerous condition to exist. As in the present case, there was no allegation of negligence on the
part of anyone but the plaintiff, Moore-McCormick Lines.
The plaintiff was insured under a general liability policy
and its insurer settled the suit with the employee. It
then brought the action against Maryland Casualty,
claiming that Moore-McCormick Lines was an omnibus
insured under the automobile policy issued to the construction company and that the accident arose out of
the loading and unloading of the truck. The court, noting
that there was no claim (in the action brought by the
employee) of any negligence in the loading of the bags
onto the truck which in any way caused or contributed
to the accident, said:
''The case turns on the narrow legal issue of
whether an insurance carrier can be charged with
liability under a 'loading and unloading' clause of
a policy of automobile liability insurance where
there is no negligence of any kind claimed in connection with the loading or unloading operation."
The court, pointing out that it was required to rely on
the law of the State of New York, whose highest decision
in point was that in Emplovers Mutual Liability lns'l./Jfance Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 181 N.Y.S.
2d 813 (1958), continued:
"There it was held that no liability could attach under the clause here in issue, in the absence

8

1

of a. ·showing that the accident resulted from the
negligence of defendant's insured in the loading
or unloading process.''

In Clark v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 313 F.2d 160
(7th Cir., 1960), Sinclair Refining Co. and its insurer
Zurich Insurance Co. brought suit against Travelers
Tu:idemnity Co. and its insured Rogers Cartage Co. to
recover amounts Sinclair and Zurich had been required
to pay to persons injured as a result of an explosion occurring ·on Sinclair's property.
A gasoline truck belonging to Rogers had pulled up
at the 1Sinclair bulk petroleum plant to be loaded. While
it was being loaded and as the result of faulty equipment
of Sinclair's, the truck overflowed and gasoline spilled
on the ground. Shortly thereafter a gasoline truck owned
by a third party pulled up and Sinclair's employee began loading that. A gasoline truck owned by Sinclair
then pulled up behind the other two and immediately
thereafter the explosion occurred. Persons injured as a
result of the explosion brought suit against Sinclair,
which was settled by its insurer Zurich.

The trial court found that Travelers was required
to indemnify Zurich by reason of an automobile liability
policy issued to Rogers which contained the usual loading amd unloading and omnibus clauses. The Court of
Appeals, in reversing, held that there was an inescapable
inference that use of Sinclair's truck was the proximate
contributing cause of the occurrence and that the finding
of the trial court to the contrary was clearly erroneous.

It continued:
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'' ... the explosion was caused by factors for

~hich S!n~lair h~d the sole responsibility, factors

wholly disassociated with and remote from' the
use of Rogers' truck. Consequently, the loading
of t~e R.oger,s' unit wa,s not the efficient and predommatmg cause of the explosion.''
The court stated that it ·would require a ·strained
construction to make the language of the policy applicable to the i~jury merely because ·of the presence of its
truck during the loading operation and that while the
explosion occurred during the loading operation it did
not ari,se out of such operation. Distinguishing cases
relied upon by the plaintiffs, it said that there was no
question in such cases of the negligent maintenance of
the additional insured 's premises for which responsibility was sought to be imposed on the automobile insurer,
nor any issue concerning a causal connection between
the negligence and the loading operation.
In discussing the intent of the parties in connection
with the rate paid by Rogers for the coverage, it said:
''Under the terms of the policy Rogers, the
named insured who paid the premiums, is in effect a ,self-insurer of any liability which it may
incur up to $10,000. To that extent Rogers wa·s
without protection. In contrast, Sinclair, an unnamed insured who paid no premiums, claimed
protection in full for all liability which flow~d
from its 1own negligence. This liability was discharged by Zurich, its insurer, and as we understand is included in the judgment against Travelers. This means that Sinclair was afforded
greater protection on a free ride than was Rogers
who was paying the freight.''

10

Such language is especially applicable to the facts m
the present case.
In R.ogers v. Continental Casualty Company, 155 So.
2d 641 (Fla., 1963), Continental had issued to a trucking
company an automobile policy containing the usual omnibus and loading and unloading clauses. The trucking
company was engaged in hauling barges which were
being lifted onto its trucks by a crane company. An employee of the crane company had loaded one truck and
was swinging out to get another barge when the crane
came in contact with a high tension power line. As a
result, the employee riding the crane and another were
injured. Suit was brought against the crane company
and the operator. The question was whether Continental
had a duty to defend the operator or pay any liability
imposed upon him as a result of the accident. It was
argued that he was loading the truck!s and thus was an
additional insured under Continental 's policy. In holding that Continental had no obligation to defend, the
court .said that the many cases cited by the plaintiff
were not in point, because there was no question of
causal connection between the accident and the loading
and unloading of the vehicle in those cases. It held that
a causal connection was required, and stated:

''An accident is causally connected with the
process ·of loading or unloading within the meaning of the clause, if the loading or unloading was
its efficient and predominating cause."
Holding that it was not necessary to decide whether

11

the ''coming to rest'' doctrine or the ''complete operations'' doctrine applied, the court continued:
''.But where, a~ here, the injury is caused by
a third party who is not connected with the truck
and who has no legal relationship to the named
insured and who under normal circumstances
would not be using the truck of the named insure~,. it must first ~ppear before the liability
prov1s1ons of the policy beoome applicable that
such third party was in the actual use of the truck
at the time of the injury, with the express or implied permission of the named insured.''

It should be noted that the policy issued by respondent in the present case requires that the omnibus insured
be in "actual use" of the automobile.
Hartford Accident and Indenunity Company v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Company, 298 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.,
1962) was a case in which Hartford had insured a rural
gas service company Ufilder an automobile policy containing a loading and unloading clause. Fireman's Fund,
insured the company under a general liability policy excluding coverage with respect to the loading or unloading of vehicles. A delivery man of the company, delivering a tank of propane gas to a customer, went to
the wrong house where he turned on a propane tank and
found that it was not empty. The occupant of the house
advised him that they had not ordered the gas and he
then delivered the gas to the proper customer. He failed
to turn the tank, which had been disconnected from any
appliance, back off. Thereafter there was an explo·sion
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in the house, resulting from the gas tank being turned on.
Hartford paid the damages after Fireman's Fund's
refusal to do so and then brought suit to recover the
amount from Fireman's Fund. The court found in favor
of Hartford, saying:
"Olsen's turning the valve had nothing to do
with unloading the truck. His assigned use of the
truck was to deliver a tank of propane gas to
Elmer Dickens who lived in another house. His
negligent act was not a part of the delivery of
the tank to Dickens. It had no relation to or connection with unloading or delivery. Neither the
tank nor the truck, including its equipment, was
used by Olsen in the commi.ssion of his negligent
act. In mistakenly turning on the valve, Olsen did
something independent of and entirely removed
from his use of the truck for the business purpose
of his trip ...
"The mere fact that the negligent act occurred before the unioad.ing or delivery wa1s completed is of no consequence where such negligence
has no relation to it and did not arise out of the
use of the motor vehicle as defined within the
limits of Hartford's policy provisiions." (Emphasis added).
The court then said that even though its jurisdiction
followed the ''complete operations'' rule, the explosion
and occurrences leading up to it did not come within the
loading and unloading provision of Hartford's automobile policy and Fireman's Fund was liable under its
general liability policy.
A New York ca·se which points out the inapplicability
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of the Wagman case, cited by appellants, is Eastern
Chemicals, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 199
N.Y.S.2d 48 (1960). There, a trucking company was engaged to haul products for Eastern Chemicals. While it
was engaged in such hauling, but when there was no
activity in the unloading process, one of the containers
on the truck exploded, and the truck driver was injured.
Continental insured the trucking company under a policy
oontaining the usual loading and unloading and omnibus
clauses. The truck driver sued Eastern Chemicals and it
and its insurer brought suit to compel Continental to
defend the action, upon the basis that plaintiff was an
additional insured under the policy. (It will be noted
that the relationship of the parties was identical to that
in the present case.) The court in holding that ContinPntal had no liability said:
"Since the adoption in this state of the 'complete operation' doctrine in the matter of loading
and unloading by the Court of Appeals in Wagman v. American Fidelity & Casualty Go., there
can be no doubt that Eastern would be an additional insured of Continental if the accident in
which Mitchell was injured was caused by some
negligent act in the loading or unloading.
''In the Wagman case as well as in those
which have followed it to the same conclusion,
there was no question about negligence causing
the damage during the loading or unloading process. In that case the claim of the injured per·s~n
was for nealigence on the part of one engaged m
the cnmplete operation of loading or unloading .. ·
" ... we are presented with a different prob·
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le~. He.re the injured person, Mitchell, by his own
aff1~av1t, expressly disclaims any negligence in
loadmg or unloading either in the former narrow
sense or in the now 'complete operation' sense.
If he makes no such claim, there is no coverage
for the. named insured, Dubrey, or for any unnamed msured ... Even standing by itself and
with all the liberality to be given to the con~truc
tion of a pleading, it would take a very strained
construction to so hold in the light of the negligence charged against Eastern by way of 'allowing the shipment of an inherently dangerous prioduct without adequate safeguards ... Here, the
injured person expressly said that his injuries
occurred through causes wholly unrelated to 'loading and unloading' in any sense. On the basis of
such claim by the injured person, there is no coverage for either the named or unnamed assured.''

In Travelers Insurance Company v. Buckeye Union
Casualty Co., 172 Ohio S.T. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961),
the defendant had issued an automobile policy containing
the general loading and unloading and omnibus clauses
to an owner of a tank truck. At the time of the accident,
the insured vehicle wa,s on the premises of a bulk diesel
fuel station, an employee of which moved a pipe toward
the truck in order to fill it. A quantity of diesel fuel
rushed out of the pipe and knocked the truck driver off
the truck onto the ground. The plaintiff, who was insurer
under a policy of premises liability insurance covering
the fuel station, claimed that the automobile policy covered the liability of the owner of the fuel station and that
its policy was merely excess insurance.
The court held that the fuel station employee was
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not using the truck for any purpose at the time of the
accident so as to have liability for his negligence come
within the coverage of the policy of insurance covering
the truck and said:
"Although 'using' and 'actual use' dio· not
have the limited meaning of 'operating' or 'actual operation' . . . neither can ,such words be
extended beyond what may reasonably be implied
from the circumstances of the caise or the relationship of the parties. -Where third parties are
involved, it cannot be validly claimed that mutual
acquiescence constitutes permissive use until
some particular use of the truck appears which
may be the subject of acquiescence.''
The court noting that there was no movement by
any·one of anything which had any relationship to the
purposeful presen<~e of the truck continued:
''To accord to this policy the construction
which Travelers claims was intended leads to the
conclusion that McCracken paid premiums to
Buckeye so that Buckeye would insure and protect Gulf against the claims of McCracken. It
seems doubtful that the parties to the oontract
so intended. In our opinion, Gulf '·s employee was
not using McCracken's truck for any purpose.
He was not therefore an 'insured' under the
policy issued by Buckeye.''
This case was followed by the Ohio court in Buckeye Union Casualty Co. v. Illinois National Insurarnce
Co., 206 N.E.2d 209 (1965), where a store employee
.slammed a trunk lid on a customer'•s head while loading
"'roceries in an automobile. The court held that there was
b
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not an actual use of the automobile by the named insured
or with his permission and further said that the clause
cannot be used to extend coverage for injurie,s to an
insured:
''The action to be def ended by Illinois must
be against an insured of Illinois. Under this holding, we cam never arrive at a finding that the
insured may be a claimant against a company
which has computed the risk to protect the insured
only against the claims of others.''
In Zurich General Accident Insurance Co. v. American Mutual Life Insurance Co., 192 Atl. 387 (N.J., 1937),
the insurer was held not liable for damages resulting
when the insured's driver delivered a can of milk and
some ice to a customer's place of business. After he had
unloaded them from the truck and was about to place
them in the customer's ice box, the customer was injured
by an ice pick in the driver's pocket. The court therein
stated:
"The contracting parties plainly contemplated
an accident immediately identified with the ownership, maintenance, use or operation of the
vehicle and the mishap which befell (the customer) does not fall into that category. The
words (of the loading and unloading clause) relate to the vehicle itself, and exclude accidents
which are only remotely connected with its ownership, maintenance, use or operation. A construction that would include within a coverage
clause so phrased, the thing being done when t?i.s
accident happened would impart to it an artificial meaning at variance with the apparent intention of the parties."
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In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Employe·rs Casualty
Co., 370 S.W.2d 105 (Texas Civ. App., 1963), three per.
sons were killed by the collapse of a crane loading onto
trucks insured by the defendant. The general liability
insurer of the crane company tried to recover from the
insurer of the trucks under the loading and unloading
clause. The court in denying recovery said:
"We think also that coverage under the 'loading and unloading' provisions includes a requirement of showing ·some causal connection between
the loading or unloading and the accident ... In
this case, so far as the record ,shows it was a
defect in Borders crane which caused the accident, not anything done in the unloading of Capitol '·s truck. The connection between the accident
and unloading of the truck seems too remote tio
include coverage of the accident under Capitol's
policy."
Other cases which require a direct causal connection between the actual loading and unloading of the
truck and the accident are Travelers Insurance Co. v.
.American Hardware Mutual, Insurance Co., 209 N.E.2d
344 (Mass., 1965); Morgan v. New York Casualty Co.,
188 S.E. 581 (Ga., 1936); Kaufmann v. Liberty Insurance
Co., 264 F.2d 863 (3rd Cir., 1959); Bituminous Casualty
Corp. v. Hartford .Accident and Indemnity Co., 330 F.2d
96 (7th Cir., 1964); Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Co·.,
:~8 A.2d 493 (Pa., 1944).
The foregoing cases clearly establish (1) that there
must be a causal relationship between the loading and
unloading of the automobile and the injury complained
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of or, specifically, that the use of the automobile must
be the efficient and predominating cause of the accident·
'
(2) that considering the intent of the parties such provisions cannot be construed to extend coverage for injuries to an insured resulting from the negligence of a
third party, as the insurance company has computed a
ri,sk to protect the insured only against the claims of
others; (3) that in the action for which indemnity is
sought, there must be some allegation regarding the
use of the insured automobile, and, in fact, an actual
use thereof.
An additional case basing lack of coverage upon the
last point is Morga;n v. New York Casualty Co., 188 S.E.
581 (Ga., 1936). Employees of the plaintiff, who was
covered by an automobile policy with a loading and unloading clause, were unloading coal dO"\\'ll a chute. They
left the chute open and a pedestrian fell through it. The
pedestrian brought suit against the plaintiff alleging
that he was negligent in leaving the coal chute open and
unattended and not placing a rail around the same or a
red light or other warning to warn pedestrians of the
danger. The court holding that the automobile insurer
was not responsible said that there was no claimed injuries resulting from negligent operation from the use
of the truck in any way:
"Of oour,se, irnsofar as the allegations of the
(pedestrian',s) petition show, the coal may have
been hauled to the ooal chute in a wagon or rolled
there in a wheelbarrow. In other words, there is
nothing in that ,suit that in any way connects the

19

use of the automobile truck covered in the insurance contract with the open coal chute ... So it
clearly appears in the allegations of the Freeman
petition that the p:rioximate cause of his injury
was not from the use ·or operation ·of the truck
transporting of materials or merchandise and
loading or unloading but the pro:JGimate cause of
hi.s injuries was his falling i1nto an open and untended ooal chute.''
A·s stated earlier, and as will be ·shown below, all of
the cases cited by appellants are distinguishable. In
Bobier v. National Casualty Co., 143 Ohio 215, 54 N.E.2d
798 (1944), ·one of the cases cited by appellants, the injuries resulted to a third party from acts involved in the
loading or unloading. There was no question of causation
or of the other factors mentioned above. More recent
decisions from the State of Ohio support defendant's
position in this case.
In Wagma;n v. A_.merican Fidelity & Casualty, 304
N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952), the injurie.s again were
caused to a third party by an employee of the store. The
case was decided upon the basis that the store's liability
was vicarious, thus it could recover from its negligent
employee any amounts it had been required to pay because of its vicarious liability. The employee was an
~dditio~al insured and the store had a cause of action
against both its employee and his insurer.
In that case the employer had been sued by the injured third ·party and then cross-claimed against its
employee Wagman. Not only was there no question of
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causation, but the injuries were caused by the negligence
·of the ·employee not the store.

Industrial Indemnity Co. v. General Insurance Co.
of America, 26 Gal. Rep. 2d 568 (1962) was also a case of
vicarious liability on the part of an employer whose
employe~·s were not covered by his general liability
policy. Hence, the court held that the defendant's automobile policy was primary. The same elements that distinguish the prior c&ses distinguish this one. The court
further pointed out that if the employees had been covered by the plaintiff's policy that insurance would be
primary, not the automobile insurance policy.
Travelers Insurance Company v. W. F. Saunders
Sons, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 126, 238 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1933)
is further distinguishable on the .same basis as the preceding cases. It involved the question of one vicariously
liable recovering from his employee who was deemed to
be an omnibus insured under the loading and unloading
provision. There was the lack of a question of causal
relationship. New York decisions which are more closely
in point to the present case reach a different result.

In Drew Chemical Corp. v. American Fore & Loy-

alty, 218 A.2d 875 (N.J., 1966) there again wais the question of vicarious liability on the part of the insured employer but the question of causal relationship was specifically discussed. Such causal relationship was held to
bave existed, the court saying that ''all that is required
to establish coverage is that the act or omission which
resulted in the injury was necessary to carry out the
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loading and unloading.'' (Emphasis added). The act or
omission in that case was clearly part of the unloading
process because they \Vere clearing a hose which was
connected to the truck and used to unload the acid into
a tank.
In the present case it cannot be said that the act or
omission which resulted in the injury was in any way
related to the loading or unloading. The act or omission
which caused the injury according to the injured party
himself was the negligent maintenance of unsafe condition of plaintiff's ·stairs and loading dock. It certainly
was not necessary to the unloading of any of plaintiff's
merchandise that they maintain an unsafe and dangerous
condition on their premises.
In Flo-at-Away Door Co. v. Continental Casualty
Company, 372 F.2d 701 (5th Cir., 1967) there was no
question of causation. The injuries resulted to an employee of a third party as a direct result of the negligent
loading of the truck. The principal issue was whether
there could be any liability when the injury occurred
after the omnibus insured bad completed the loading
operation. The court held that since the omnibus insured
was covered as an insured while using the vehicle, the
extent of coverage should be measured by the clause
obligating the insurer to pay damages "arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile,''
and said "clearly the accident 'arose out of' the negligent loading of the trailer by Float-Away, at which time
it was an additional insured under the policy." The
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court on petition for rehearing clearly distinguished between a situation where the injured person was an employee of the named insured and where he was employed
by a third party. The injured pernon in Float-Away
plainly contended in his action against the omnibus insured that his injuries arose out of the negligent loading
of the vehicle; not because of an unsafe condition of its
premises. The requirement that the loading and unloading of the automobile must be the efficient and predominating cause of the accident, was met.
The court in McCloskey & Co. v. Allstate Insurance
Co\, 358 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir., 1966) did discuss the question of causation. The court, merely applying the coniplete operations rule, indicated that the unloading had
begun at the time of the accident, said both parties had
litigated the case on the implicit premise that negligence
in the handling operation of the crane had caused the
accident and that, assuming thi·s to be so, the preparatory
acts involved in unloading were an efficient and predominating cause of the accident. The case was remanded, however, so that the insurer could present any defenses it might have to negative any conclusion that the
injury arose out of the unloading process.

In many of the caises cited by appellants, the injured party had claimed that his injurie s arose out of
what was eventually determined to be the loading or unloading process. That is not the situation in the present
case where the injured employee claimed and the facts
1
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establish that the injuries arose out of conditions in no
way connected with the loading or unloading process.

Thompson Heating Corp. v. Hardware Inde-mnity it
Insurance Co., 74 Ohio App. 350, 58 N.E.2d 809 (1944)
was a case somewhat similar to Pacific .Auto, the Utah
caise, in that the plaintiff was the named insured under
two policies-one a general liability and the other an
automobile liability. The question was which of the two
afforded coverage. The court pointed out that the truck
from which the hose was extending was specifically
manufactured for blowing rock wool. Hence, the accident
arose during the unloading process. The case affords
respondent considerably more comfort than it does appellants as pointed out under Point III below.
In Hertz Corp. v. Bellin, 288 A.D.2d 1101, 284
N.Y.S.2d 140 (1967) the facts were not stated in the report
of the caise. It isn't even possible to tell who was injured.
The most it indicates is that when an injury results from
an employee pushing an empty dolly after unloading a
truck it is part of the unloading process.
The only case cited by appellants which is difficult
to di,stinguish is that of Continental Casualty Company
v. Duffy, 26 A.D.2d 60, 272 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1966). However, its persuasivene,ss is somewhat diminished when the
same court in the same volume of the reports concludes,
under a fact situation remarkably close to the present
case, that there was no causal connection and hence no
coverage. In Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal v. Phoenix
of Hartford Ins. Co., 26 A.D.2d 267, 272 N.Y.S.2d 443
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(1966) the injured party in the prior personal injury suit
had been injured when he slipped from a platform while
loaiding a truck at the plaintiff '.s warehouse. He alleged
in his complaint against the plaintiff that the accident
was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in permitting grease to accumulate on the loading platform of the
warehouse premises which rendered the platform s~ip
pery and dangerous. The court pointed out that there was
no allegation of negligence in the actual loading or unloading of the truck. While it was true that the accident
occurred during the loading process, it was not the result of any act or omission incident thereto. The accident,
it said, could have happened to any one who walked on
the platform (as it could have in the present case.) It
thus did not arise out of the complete operation of moving goods to or from the truck. Summary judgment in
favor of the defendant insurer was affirmed.
Appellants, in their brief, appear to admit that
there was no causal relationship between the use of the
truck and the injuries to Mr. Kodat, but say that
"nothing in the automobile liability policy requires the
accident be proximately caused by use of the truck." Of
course, automobile policies generally do not specifically
provide that the injury must be "proximately caused"
but the question of proximate cause is always present.
.As stated in the General Accident case, supra., there
must be the same degree of causal connection between
the loading or unloading and the accident as would be
required between the actual driving of the vehicle itself
and the resulting accident. Here, there was no oonnec-
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tion. Mr. Kodat's injuries resulted, he alleged, from the
defective and dangerous condition of the appellants'
premises. There is no support in the record for appellants' statement that if Mr. Kodat had not been carrying the bills of lading in his left hand he would not have
slipped. If that was the case, then the injuries were
caused by Mr. Kodat's own negligence, and there was
no liability.
All that appellants are really doing in this case is
restating the complete operations doctrine, and that is
all the cases cited by them stand for. Respondent doe·s
not quarrel with that doctrine but contend that the accident must not only have occurred during the loading or
unloading process but mnst have been caused by it. In
some of the cases cited above the accidents were much
more closely connected with an actual loading or unloading of the vehicle than in the present case, but since
the loading or unloading was not the efficient and predominating cause of the accident there was no coverage.

II
RESPONDENT HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND
APPELLANTS AGAINST THE SUIT BROUGHT BY
THE INJURED THIRD PARTY FOR THE REASON
'rHAT THE COMPLAINT-A-CLEARLY EXCLUDED
COVERAGE UNDER RESPONDENT'S POLICY.
Innumerable cases establish that a liability insurer
has no duty to def end an insured unless the complaint
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or petition in the suit alleges facts which, at the very
least, may bring the case under coverage of the policy.
The cases to that effect are so numerous that it would
serve no purpose to cite, but a few of the more recent
ones. One such case is Paulin v. Fireman's Fwnd Insurance Co., 403 P.2d 555 (Ariz., 1965). The plaintiff while
driving in his car stopped and grabbed a lady private
detective who had been following him and forceably held
her in the car until the police arrived. She thereafter
brought suit for assault and battery and false imprisonment, the defense of which was tendered to defendant.
Defendant declined defense on the grounds that the
policy did not provide coverage for injuries intentionally
caused by the insured. Appellant contended that the insurance company could not refuse to defend against a
suit by a third party on the grounds that the allegations
of the complaint excluded coverage when the facts known,
are reasonably ascertainable by it, indicated that the
claim was covered. The court rejected this contention
and held for the insurer, stating:
"The great weight of authority in the United
States seems to be that the obligation of the liability insurance company under policy provisions
substantially the same as now before us is to be
determined by the allegations of the complaint to
be defended (citing cases).''

In Town of Tieton v. General Insurance Company of

America, 380 P.2d 127 (Wash., 1963) the plaintiff town
had been sued by an individual who claimed that hi,s well
had been contaminated when the town constructed· a
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sewage lagoon. The complaint alleged three causes of
of action: ( 1) negligence in the construction of the
sewage lagoon; (2) an unconstitutional damaging; and
(3) nuisance. The insurance company which had issued
a liability policy to the tovvn covering damages "caused
by accident'' refused to defend the town on the last two
counts. The Washington court in holding for the insurer's
stated:
"The duty to defend under such provision is
determined by the allegations of the complaint ...
"vVhile an accident may occur without negligence, a complaint, alleging an unconstitutional
taking or damaging, or nuisance, by itself, does
not allege an accident ... Since the allegations
accompanying these theories do not allege facts
oonstituting an accident, appellant was justified
in refusing to defend respondent at the second

trial.''

Another pertinent case is Crist v. Potomac Insurance Company, 413 P.2d 407 (Ore., 1966). The defendant
had issued a property damage policy to plaintiff which
contained an exclusion as to "property controlled by
the named insured, property in the care, custody or control of insured or property as to which the insured for
any purpose is exercising physical control.''
One Roberts had contracted to move logs for plaintiff by means of a shovel loader belonging to Roberts.
One of plaintiff's employees without authorization and
in the absence of Roberts' operator attempted to operate
the loader, tipping it over and damaging it. Roberts
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sued plaintiffs and the case was settled by the payment
of $2,500 by plaintiffs. The insurance company refused
to def end the action upon the ground that the complaint
by Roberts excluded coverage. The court upheld the refusal to def end saying:
''This court adheres to the rule that the obligation of the insurer to defend is to be determined
by the allegations of the complaint filed against
the insured.''
Inasmuch as the complaint showed that the employee
was operating the loader, and hence was in phy.sical
control of it, the exclusionary clause applied and there
was no coverage. The court concluded:
"Hence, we hold that the complaint in the
Roberts case failed to state a claim against the
present plaiintiffs covered by the policy, and the
defendant insurance company was, therefore,
under no obligation to defend the action."
Appellants cite .several California cases holding
that in some instances the insurer is bound to defend if
the facts known to it indicate there is coverage regardless of the allegations of the complaint. This is definitely
only a minority rule and even in jurisdictions where followed, the complaint must present, at the very leaet, the
possibility that damages covered by the policy might be
obtained. In Gray v. Zurich Insurarnce Co., 419 P.2d 168
(Cal., 1966) the complaint was for bodily injury which
was clearly covered by the policy except for an exclusionary clause relating to intentional injuries. Deciding that
there was a duty to defend the court noted that "since
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the policy sets forth the duty to defend as a primary one
and since the insurer attempts to avoid it only by an
unclear exclusionary clause, the insurer would reasonably expect, and is legally entitled to such protection."
That the reasoning of Gray would not be extended to
cover the facts of the present case is evidenced by an apt
discussion therein:
"The insured counters with the contention
that this position would compel &n insurer 'issuing a policy covering liability of the insured for
maintenance, use or operation of an automobile
... to def end the insured in an action for damages for negligently mainta~ning a stairway and
thereby allegedly causing injury to another because the insured claims that the ,suit for damages was false or groundle,ss '. The 'groundless,
false or fradulent' clause, however, does not extend the obligation to defend without limits; it
includes only defense to those actions of the nature and kind covered by the policy."

Theodore v. Zurich General Accident Liability Insurance Co., 364 P.2d 51 (Alaska, 1961), cited by appellants, specifically states that the obligation of the insurer
to defend is controlled by the allegations made in the
complaint. There the complaint was sufficient, hut the
insurer felt that the allegations did not state the true
facts. The question of reasonableness of the settlement
was not discussed. The court merely held that the insurer
after ,breaching its duty to defend did not have the right
to later show that there was no coverage. Respondent
does not argue with that case in any way, but it is not
applicable.
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III
ASSUMING THAT THERE IS COVERAGE
UNDER RESPONDENT'S POLICY, APPELLANTS
H.A'.VE THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE
SETTLEMENT WAS A REASONABLE ONE AND
IN GOOD FAITH, AND THIS BURDEN INVOLVES
THE DETERMINATION OF A DISPUTED QUESTION OF FACT.
Appellants' statement that once a duty to defend
is breached, the insurer becomes liable to indemnify the
insured for the entire loss resulting from the breach is
not supported by the cases-not even those cited by
appellants. In Thompson Heating Corporation v. Hardware Indemnity & Insurance Company, supra, for example, the trial court found that there was no duty to
defend and granted summary judgment for the insurer.
On reversal, the supreme court noted that if there had
been a ,sufficient finding that the settlement made by
the insured had been a reasonable one and made in good
faith, it would enter judgment for the plaintiffs. Since
there wa;s not a sufficient finding of reasonableness the
court remanded, noting that the burden of proof was on
the plaintiff to show that the settlement was reasonable.
In Richie v. Anchor Casiialty Co., 286 P.2d 1000
(Cal., 1955) the court stated that the refusal to defend
gave the plaintiffs "the right to make any reasonable
and bona fide compromise of the adion against them.''
(Emphasis added.)
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To the same effect was Theodore v. Zurich Geneeral Accident and Liability Insurance Company, supra,
and Arenson v. National Auto &': Casualty Insurance
Company, 310 P.2d 961 (Cal., 1957).
Other cases cited by appellants do not hold otherwise,
In the Lowe and Gray cases, for example, there had not
been a settlement but a judgment entered against the
insured, 1so the question of reasonableness was not
raised. Missionaries of the Company of Mary, Inc., v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 230 A.2d 21 (Conn., 1967),
like the Theodore case, did not deal with the question of
reasonableness but whether the insurer after breaching
its duty to defend could then attempt to show that there
was no coverage. Nor \ms the question of rea,sonablenes~
discussed in Kong Yick Investment Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 423 P.2d 935 (Wash., 1967). There the
only question was whether the complaint ,stated facts
which came within coverage of the policy.
In the present case, it would appear from Mr. Kodat 's
own deposition (R. 31 lines 9-11; R. 33 lines 15-22; R.
35 lines 6-29; R. 49 lines 15-30; R. 50 lines 1-13) that the
injuries to Mr. Kodat were, at the very least, contributed
to by his own negligence. Thus, a settlement of $15,000
was not reasonable and (assuming coverage) respondent
should not be liable to indemnify appellants' insurer,
simply because appellants' insurer elected to pay a
wholly unjustified claim in the hope of forcing some kind
of a contribution from respondent.
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IV
COVERAGE IS EXCLUDED BY A PROVISION
IN THE POLICY MAKING THE POLICY INAPPLICABLE TO ANY LOSSES COVERED BY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
Exclusion '' e" of respondent ',s policy provides:
"This policy does not apply, under coverage
'A' to any obligation for which the insured or any
carrier as his insurer may be held liable under
any workmen's compensation law ... "
In the present case the injury to Mr. Kodat was an
obligation for which the named insured, Associated
Foods, Inc., was liable under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Law. In fact, the State Insurance Fund paid
to Mr. Kodat the sum of $10,269.64, more than two-thirds
the amount of the settlement. From the settlement made
with Mr. Kodat, the State Insurance Fund having actually joined with Mr. Kodat in instituting the suit
against appellants, recovered the amount it had paid
(R. 59). If appellants should be entitled to recover from
respondents in this action, the State Insurance Fund
would, in effect, be recovering amounts it paid out to
Mr. Kodat under an obligation to do so by contract with
Associated Foods, Inc. Such result is excluded by the
policy and also by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) provide.s:
"The right to recover compensation pursuant
to provisions of this title fior injurie~ sustained
by an employee ... shall be the exclusive remedy
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against the employer and shall be the exclusive
remedy against any officer, agent or employee of
the employer and the liabilities of the employer
imposed by this act shall be in place of any a:nd
all other civil liability whatsoever at common law
or otherwise to such employee .... ''
While this action is not directly against the employer, the result is the same inasmuch as it pays the
premiums both to the State Insurance Fund and to respondent. These premiums are affected by the number of
claims made under the policies.
The only exception to Section 35-1-60 is Section 351-62 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which allows the employee to bring an action against a third party who,se
wrongful act has caused the injuries complained of.
Here, however, the action is not against the negligent
third party but by it.
Whether or not the above provision of the policy and
the ·workmen's Compensation Law prevent plaintiff
from recovering all the amounts paid to Mr. Kodat, they
would at least be precluded from recovering the amount
for which the State Insurance Fund was the real party
in interest.

v
EVEN ASSUMING LIABILITY, APPELLANTS'
POLICY PROVIDED PRIMARY COVERAGE.
The Utah cases cited by appellants, Russell v. Poulson, 118 Utah 2d 157, 417 P .2d 658 ( 1966), deals with the
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situation, as does several of this court's prior decisions,
where both policies were for automobile liability. They
covered the same type of risk. The reasoning in those
cases should not apply to a situation where there is one
policy specifically intended for and covering a certain
type of risk and another policy which may happen to
include the loss within its scope. There have been a number of tests to determine primary and excess insurance.
One often advanced by the courts is that where there is
a specific and a general policy the specific policy is
primary. See Couch on Insurance 2d., Section 62 :59.
The claim against appellants in this case clearly
arose out of an alleged defect in their premise,s for which
they would be covered under United Pacific's policy. It
would be the more specific policy.
Another factor, which frequently determines whether coverage is excess or primary or indeed whether there
is coverage at all is the intent of the parties to the insurance contract. As stated in a number of the cases cited
herein, it is doubtful that the parties to respondent's
policy had intended that a third party who had no connection with the contract would be covered under the
policy for injuries resulting from its own negligence and
not even of the type for which the insurance was written.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants were sued for an injury resulting allegedly from their own negligence in maintaining unsafe
and defective premises. Their insurer, who is the real
party in interest in this case, and who issued a policy to
appellants specifically covering such situations, now
attempts to place liability upon the insurer of the injured person and his employer who wrote a policy to
cover liabilities for injuries arising out of the use of an
automobile. The injured party in his action against appellants made no claim whatsoever that his injury arose
out of the use of an automobile or that loading or unloading caused the injuries. In fact it did not. Apart
from the question of intention there are various other
reasons why as a matter of law summary judgment was
properly granted to respondents:
1. Appellants were not using the automobile insured
by respondent in any sense of the word and more specifically, there wa,s no actual use of the vehicle by them
as the policy requires in the case of unnamed insureds.
2. Even if appellants could be said to have been using
the automobile insured by respondent, there was no
causal relationship between the use of such automobile
and the injury complained of. The injury was caused by
factors for which appellants had sole responsibility, and
factors which were wholly <lisassof·iated with and remote
from the use of an automobile. Such use was not the
efficient and predominant cause of the injury.
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3. Respondent had no obligation to defend appellants
or provide coverage to them, because there was no allegation in the action brought by the injured party that in
any way connected the automobile insured by d!Olfendants
with the injury, nor any evidence that respondent knew
of facts which would connect it. The injured party himself said that the injury arose out of negligent maintenance and unsafe condition of appellants' loading dock.
4. Appellants motion for summary judgment cannot
be granted because the reasonableness and good faith of
appellants settlement is disputed by respondent.
5. The injury was covered by workmen's compensation and coverage is excluded by the expres.s terms of
respondent's policy, as it was an obligation for which the
insured or its insurer could be held liable under the
Workmen'.s Compensation Law.
6. The policy written by the real party in interest in
this ca·se specifically covers the injury so in any event its
insurance would he primary.
7. The clauses involved cannot be used to extend
coverage to an insured.
None of the cases cited by respondent, except perhaps one, would extend coverage under the loading and
unloading and omnibus clauses to the extent it is advocated by appellants here, whereas cases involving like
situations specifically exclude coverage. For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment granted to re-
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spondent should be affirmed. In the event it is not
affirmed, factual questions, particularly those relating
to the reasonableness of the settlement, would preclude
summary judgment for appellants.
Respectfully submitted,

SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.
RALPH L. JERMAN
510 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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